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AbStrACt – In this paper I shall deal with the question of whether a 
State-granted minimal income (which is not the same as a basic income) 
is a necessary condition in order for individuals (1) to attain a basic level 
of autonomy; and (2) to develop capabilities that allow them to improve 
the quality of their life. As a theoretical basis for my analysis I shall use 
Honneth’s theory of recognition, Sen’s capability approach (also in the 
version offered by Nussbaum), and Simmel’s concept of independency 
as developed in his Philosophy of Money. A minimal income aims at 
guaranteeing not only the survival of the extremely poor (this could also 
be achieved by emergency programs), but also – in cooperation with 
other State programs such as education, medical and legal assistance etc 
– at enabling these individuals to be more independent from their social 
environment, where dependence often constitutes a strong obstacle to 
the development of their autonomy. the social and political inclusion 
of millions of people, both in threshold countries and in poor countries, 
depends upon the existence of such programs. 
KeywordS – recognition. Autonomy. Honneth. Sen. Simmel. Capabilities. 
Minimal income.
reSUMo – o artigo investiga se uma renda mínima assegurada pelo 
estado (que não é a mesma coisa que uma renda básica) é uma condição 
necessária para que indivíduos (1) atinjam um patamar básico de autono- 
mia e (2) desenvolvam “capabilidades” que os permitam incrementar 
a sua qualidade de vida. Como embasamento teórico para a minha 
análise, utilizarei a teoria do reconhecimento de Honneth, a abordagem 
de “capabilidade” de Sen (também na versão oferecida por Nussbaum) 
e o conceito de independência de Simmel, como foi desenvolvido em sua 
Filosofia do Dinheiro. A renda mínima visa garantir não só a sobrevivência 
dos extremamente pobres (isso também poderia ser realizado através 
de programas emergenciais), mas também – em cooperação com outros 
programas do estado, tais como educação, assistência médica e jurídica 
etc – permitir que esses indivíduos sejam mais independentes do seu 
ambiente social, onde muitas vezes a dependência constitui um forte 
obstáculo ao desenvolvimento da sua autonomia. A inclusão social e 
política de milhões de pessoas, tanto em países em desenvolvimento 
quanto nos países pobres, depende da existência de tais programas.
PAlAvrAS-CHAve – Autonomia. Capabilidades. Honneth. reconhecimento. 
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Introduction
In his Struggle for Recognition Axel Honneth aims – among other 
things – at actualizing some fundamental intuitions that Hegel exposed in 
his writings from the Jena period (HoNNetH 1992). Honneth’s intention 
is to “validate”, so to speak, Hegel’s conclusions by using the findings 
of empirical sciences such as Mead’s social psychology or winnecott’s 
psychoanalytical theory. In this context, I’m not interested in valuating the 
plausibility of this attempt and its results (which, by the way, I consider 
quite convincing). rather, it is my intent to focus on a question that in 
my opinion is not developed enough both in Hegel’s and in Honneth’s 
account of the formation of the individual conscience through recognition. 
I’m referring to the question of the rising of an autonomous subject in a 
social dimension, which is on the one hand wider than the familiar one 
of the love relationship between mother and child (the first dimension in 
the formation of identity considered by Hegel and Honneth), and which 
on the other hand has not directly to do with the legal dimension of the 
mutual recognition of individual rights (the second dimension introduced 
by our authors). In other word, I’ll try to explore the open space lying 
between the recognition forms of Liebe and Recht in order to identify a 
further form of recognition, which is as essential as the mentioned ones 
and which concerns what Amartya Sen calls “capabilities”, Philippe van 
Parijs calls “real freedom” and Georg Simmel calls “independency”, and 
which I shall call simply “basic autonomy” (see SeN, 1992 and 1999; va n  
PArIJS, 1995 and SIMMel, 1900). Finally, I shall defend the necessity of 
a minimal basic income as essential condition for developing this kind 
of autonomy.
1.  Love, Right, and the Missing Link
In the Jena manuscripts Hegel identifies three forms of recognition, 
which are the basis for the development of the individual identity of any 
subject: love, right, and solidarity. through them individuals develop 
different forms of self-consciousness – forms that Honneth, in his reading 
of Hegel, calls respectively: self-confidence (Selbstvertrauen), self-respect 
(Selbstachtung) and self-esteem (Selbstschätzung) (HoNNetH, 1992, 
148 ff.). 
According to Honneth, love relates to the fact that we are beings 
with both physical and emotional necessities. through the love of others 
(primarily of our mother, later of our friends and lovers) we develop self-
confidence. the corresponding forms of disrespect are violence and 
abuse, which threaten our physical and psychological integrity. the 
recognition of legal rights refers to us as morally responsible subjects and A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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endows us with self-respect. the corresponding forms of disrespect are 
legal discrimination and deprivation of rights, which threaten our social 
integrity. Finally, solidarity refers to us as members of a community in 
which our capacities and qualities are recognized and appreciated. this 
gives rise to our self-esteem. Humiliation and offense (the corresponding 
forms of disrespect) violate our honor and dignity.
while I agree with Honneth’s Hegelian stance according to which 
human beings generally develop their identities in an inter-subjective 
context and particularly in a ‘healthy’ self-consciousness through 
recognition by others, I have the impression that in his description of the 
different forms of recognition (love, right, and solidarity) and of “practical 
self-relation” (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) Honneth 
is leaving something out. More precisely, he (and Hegel before him) is 
jumping from the intimate sphere of love relations (with the mother, with 
the family, with friends and lovers) to the public sphere of legal relations 
(with other rights bearers, with the State etc.). I wonder whether there 
is an intermediate sphere, in which individuals develop what I shall 
call in quite generic way autonomy. this sphere has to do with the third 
sphere considered by Honneth, that is, the sphere of broad social relations 
(broad in a double sense: they go further than more intimate ones such 
as family, friendship etc., and they are more generic than merely legal 
relations). the corresponding form of recognition, solidarity, is conceived 
by Honneth as a form of actively caring for the self-development of 
others (HoNNetH, 1992, 210) and seems to presuppose that every 
individual depends essentially from the others’ help in order to develop 
her qualities, even if Honneth does not explicitly defend this position. 
this is precisely what I shall do, and I shall try to defend the idea that 
the formation of autonomy depends not only on love, on legal rights and 
on solidarity-as-(individual)-care, but also and essentially on certain 
social and economic conditions which may vary very much in different   
societies. 
I shall start offering a broad definition of individual autonomy and I 
shall later try to refine this definition through reference to the different 
ways in which individuals can reach autonomy.
2.  Autonomy and its conditions
we attribute autonomy to an individual if she is able to act according 
to a personal plan of good life (a plan that may correspond to or be inspired 
by existing models of good life) and to consider herself and the others 
as being able to establish mutual relations of moral and legal obligation 
(in other words, if she is able to see herself and the others as bearers of A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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rights and duties).1 this definition refers to what we could call a minimal 
level of autonomy, since the latter can be developed at several degrees: 
an individual becomes the more autonomous (1) the more she defines 
her life plan independently from the models offered by her environment 
(both the narrower one – family, friends, restricted community – and the 
wider one – her culture, her religious creed etc.), and (2) the more she 
defines rights and duties (for herself and for others) based on increasingly 
universal principles as opposed to merely local or parochial principles 
(such as the ones she learnt from her family or church or community). 
while in the first case reaching a greater autonomy is relevant only for 
the individual herself, since it is a matter of widening her chances of 
good life, in the second case it is relevant also for the others. therefore, 
an individual who is able to imagine for herself life models, which her 
next environment condemns morally (for instance, a woman coming from 
a very chauvinistic and patriarchal family who decides to live alone, 
even at the price of moving to another city or to a far place) increases 
her chances of living a good life; an individual who starts to see and 
treat other individuals in a different manner than her environment does 
and who, therefore, recognizes them more moral rights (for instance, a 
brother of the afore-mentioned woman who starts to consider his sister’s 
life model as morally legitimate and who starts to attribute to women 
– in general – rights that the other family members still deny based on 
their chauvinistic views) contributes to the creation of a more favorable 
environment for those individuals and their life plans. From this point of 
view, the development of a greater autonomy could be considered the 
object of a moral obligation, but I shall not deepen this point.
Now, the question is: how can individuals develop this kind of 
autonomy and deepen or widen it? In order to answer to this question, 
one should try firstly to specify more the very notion of autonomy. to 
this goal I shall turn to Philippe van Parijs’ concept of real freedom and 
to Amartya Sen’s capability approach.
1  In a more traditional way, Pauer-Studer defines autonomy as the capacity of 
assuming a reflective, critical attitude towards our spontaneous individual desires. 
“being autonomous means choosing from a set of options those for which there are 
good reasons from the point of view of our own life plan” (PAUer-StUder, 2000,   
13). According to her, one can identify several kinds of autonomy, since the latter 
“becomes concrete in specific way in different spheres of human action”. In order 
for individuals to develop other forms of autonomy, it is necessary that they are 
able to live their conception of good as they define it (ibid., 16). what I try to defend 
here is the idea that the very definition of a conception of good is an expression of 
autonomy, even if the individual still has no reflective, critical attitude towards it. 
Analogous definitions of autonomy can be found in a plurality of authors, starting 
with John rawls.A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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According to van Parijs, real freedom (as he calls it) incorporates three 
components: security, self-ownership and opportunity, “in contrast to 
formal freedom, which only incorporates the first two” (va n  PArIJS, 1995, 
22 s.). In order to be really free, an individual should not only have security 
and own herself, but also have opportunities to develop and realize a life 
plan – opportunities that van Parijs does not define exclusively as external 
or objective, but also as internal or subjective abilities and capacities to 
do something. 
thus the conception of real freedom presented above does not merely refuse 
to confine freedom-restricting obstacles to coercion – whether defined as self-
ownership-violation or as right-violation. It also refuses to confine them to 
obstacles external to the person concerned, or to obstacles that are produced 
deliberately, indeed produced at all and/or removable by other human beings. 
(va n  PArIJS, 1995, 23)
Further: “Personal abilities or talents are internal to the person, 
and it is therefore correct to say that it is possible for freedom, on this 
conception, to be restricted by internal as well as external obstacles” 
(va n  PArIJS, 1995, 24). of course, this does not mean that every missing 
ability or capacity should be seen as a violation of our freedom: the fact 
that I cannot fly or become – say – a top soccer player does not impede 
that I develop and realize an alternative plan of good life; not being able 
to read and write, on the other hand, can have a tremendous negative 
impact on my chances of living a good life.2 
we should, therefore, define freedom both with respect to the external, 
objective obstacles to it (as traditional theories do) and to the subjective 
abilities and capacities that allow individuals to develop and to follow 
their own vision of good life. the question is: how do individuals reach 
real freedom?
Amartya Sen’s capability approach can represent a way of answering 
this question. Sen distinguishes notably between functioning and 
capability. An example of functioning is riding a bicycle. riding a bicycle 
means to be engaged in an activity (in this case through an instrument: 
the bicycle). Now, the interesting question is why the cyclist is riding. 
She can be using a bicycle to ride to work or just to her leisure. In the 
first case, she can be riding because she doesn’t want to use her car (out   
 
2  In order to justify his idea of a general basic income, van Parijs insists on the impact 
of richness and income on our life plans: “via our earning power, our personal 
abilities massively affect what we shall be permitted to acquire. Conversely, what 
I can – over more than the very short term – is systematically affected by what   
I may. whether or not I shall stop limping depends on whether or not my wallet 
or the waiting list will allow me to have the operation I require” (va n  PArIJS, 
1995, 24).A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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of ecological consciousness or in order to avoid traffic), or because she 
doesn’t have a car at all; in the latter case, she can be riding because 
there is no public transport, or because there is one, but our cyclist can’t 
afford a bus, subway or train ticket. In sum: a rich, ecologically-conscious 
manager pedaling to her workplace and a poor worker riding to a factory 
in a third world country share the same functioning (riding a bike), but 
from very different perspectives. this calls in cause the idea of freedom to 
function, that is, the range of real options that a person has with regard 
to “functionings” (SeN, 1992, 56 ff.). In this sense, the rich manager has 
more freedom than the poor worker, since she can choose among a wider 
range of options (of “functionings”). Considering that certain functionings 
(like e. g. physical health) have an intrinsic, independent value, one can 
say that an individual having a wider range of options of functionings 
can be said to attain an higher level of freedom and of well-being at the 
same time.3 
Now, in order to be reached, some functioning involves a complex set 
of conditions that have to be met. Going back to the above-mentioned 
example, a woman moving to a city in order to escape the narrow world 
of her patriarchal family is exercising a functioning that involves several 
aspects beyond the physical transfer to another place: she is getting free 
from certain constraints while at the same time losing certain securities; 
she may widen her choices of having a good life or condemn herself to a 
hard life of sacrifice and to a poorly paid job (particularly if she is illiterate 
– as it is likely for a woman coming from her environment). the result of 
her move to the city depends very much on external circumstances as 
well as on her capabilities. 
this word results from the fusion of capacity and ability. According 
to Sen we cannot think of a capability as something isolated, but we 
should always consider it with reference to a set of capabilities. A person 
always has a set of capabilities which allow her to exercise a certain set of 
functionings, but there is no necessary relation between these and those: 
two individuals can have the same set of capabilities and choose different 
sets of functionings, or – on the contrary – have different capabilities 
and share certain functionings (as in the example of the manager and 
the worker both riding a bike). In Sen’s vision, capabilities are therefore 
possibilities, or opportunities of functioning. they are no mere capacities: 
saying that someone has the capability of moving freely to another city   
 
3  Martha Nussbaum stretches out that sometimes actual functioning does not only 
possess intrinsic value, but also represents the basis for exercising our free choice: 
this is the case, for instance, of reading, since only those who can read at some 
level are “able to decide to improve or abandon her reading” (CroCKer, 1995, 157).A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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does not refer to her capacity of moving (or in her being able to move), but 
to the actual options she has of really doing it. In this sense, capabilities 
refer not only to capacities and abilities, but also to states of mind, to 
other subjective states (like being healthy, being illiterate etc.) and to 
external circumstances: therefore, they can only be thought of as a set, 
not as isolated qualities. Has the woman of our example really the option 
of moving to a city in order to get a better life? Sen would invite us to 
consider whether this is an actual option for her considering everything 
that such an action would imply: for instance, abandoning the place 
where she was born; her family; a net of relationships and affections; a 
world whose symbolic code and whose values she understands and – 
at least partially – shares; a certain climate and lifestyle she is used to, 
while at the same time going to an unknown and hostile place, where 
she will be alone (at least at the beginning), and marginalized for coming 
from a poor environment and for being unable to understand the codes of 
the big city etc. It is not enough, therefore, to say that a person has the 
capability to choose a certain functioning (in this case, emigrating), if we 
do not consider all the other capabilities involved in this choice. 
Going back to van Parijs’s definition of real freedom, we could say that 
an individual has to develop a set of capabilities in order to be really free 
(in order to have what van Parijs calls opportunity, along with security 
and self-ownership). those capabilities will allow her to exercise certain 
functioning – better: to be actually able to choose among different options 
of functioning. In order to escape from her environment and to move to a 
better one, the woman from our example must have a set of capabilities, 
which involves – among others – the courage of leaving the known for 
the unknown, the strength for facing the difficulties connected to the 
new environment, a good amount of self-confidence, etc. the presence 
or absence of some capabilities from the set will influence more or less 
heavily her chances of success in the city; her literacy, her physical and 
psychological state, her ability in understanding the new codes etc., are 
good example of such capabilities.
the autonomy of an individual can be seen, therefore, as depending 
on a set of capabilities, which allows an individual to choose among a 
range of options concerning functionings – a range whose width depends 
from the capabilities themselves. In other words, autonomy depends 
on the capabilities an individual develops in the course of her life. Now, 
individuals develop their capabilities inter-subjectively, that is, in a 
social environment; but capabilities are neither necessarily the result 
of love, nor always the object of rights. It seems to me that a somehow 
not-yet-explored territory stretches between recognition through love 
and recognition through right; between self-confidence and self-respect A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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– a territory in which a form of autonomy arises, which is neither legal 
(although it may be guaranteed through legal means), nor political, nor 
social, nor economical (not even moral, at least not in the strong Kantian 
or Kohlbergian sense), but a more basic one. of course there is no great 
leap forward from the formation of a self-confident subject (via recognition 
through love) to the formation of a bearer of right endowed with self-
respect (via legal recognition). the process through which individuals 
form their identity and develop autonomy is a complex and continuous 
one. I agree with Honneth on the necessity of turning to the results of 
empirical sciences, more specifically to social psychology, in order to 
grasp this process. In the next part of this paper I shall use the theory of 
the interrelation between character structure and institution developed 
by Gerth and Mills, but this classical theory represents rather a starting 
point for further inquiries and I am aware that there are other, possibly 
better theories to explain how individual identity and autonomy arises 
(for a general vision see MArtUCCellI, 2005). In other words: For my 
argument to work, it is sufficient that one accepts the idea that personal 
identity is (at least in part, if not completely) the result of inter-subjective 
relations and processes. therefore, Gerth and Mills’s theory is used here 
merely as an example to illustrate the consequences that theories of the 
formation of individual identity and autonomy via social interplay may 
have on the theories of autonomy as real freedom (van Parijs) and as 
freedom to function (Sen).
3.  The social formation of autonomy
Gerth and Mills’ theory can be best summarized by the following 
assertion: “Man as a person is an historical creation, and can most readily 
be understood in terms of the roles which he enacts and incorporates.4 
these roles are limited by the kind of social institutions in which he 
happens to be born and in which he matures into an adult” (GertH 
and MIllS, 1964, 11). In other words: an individual’s capabilities are 
determined by her social environments, mostly through her position in 
it and through the roles she is called to assume in it.5 According to our 
authors, an individual forms a self-image through internalization of the 
image that significant others (or a generalized other) have of her, as 
well as through the fact that she is meeting the expectations that these   
 
4  this idea will be at the center of erwing Goffman’s theory of the “dramatic” aspect 
of everyday life (see GoFFMAN, 1959).
5  A central role in this process is played by language, as Gerth and Mills acknowledge 
and as Hegel had already observed in his Jena manuscripts (GertH and MIllS, 
1964, 12, note 10 and, more extensively, 81 ff.).A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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significant others have towards her with respect to certain roles, which 
are defined socially. In order to be recognized as a full member of a group 
(or of society at large), the individual has to meet role-bound expectations. 
Her education as a child and as an adolescent or young adult should 
give her the characteristics that should guarantee her success in acting 
according to her role. In other words, it will offer her certain capabilities 
for what her environment regards as a socially (or morally, or religiously) 
desirable functioning. In relatively closed, static environments such as 
a patriarchal family from the sertão, for instance, the role an individual 
is called to assume is clearly defined and the whole familial education 
is aimed at creating a person who is up to her or his role (cf. GertH and 
MIllS, 1964, 91 ff.). Such an individual may gain a conspicuous level of 
self-confidence and self-esteem, but could nevertheless lack autonomy 
in the above-mentioned sense of the capacity of widening the range 
of options, among which she can choose her life plan. to this end, she 
should develop capabilities which depend on conditions that may not 
be immediately available in her next social environment. the range of 
such conditions may vary from her having access to alternative models to 
the patriarchal family, (for instance, through personal contact with more 
emancipated individuals or even through tv)6 to her having access to 
public education, to the existence of policies specifically aimed at giving 
new chances to individuals living in poor regions, etc. the last part of my 
paper refers precisely to the material basis for autonomy as a possible 
object of public policies.
4.  The material basis for autonomy
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have insisted very much on 
the material basis for the developing of capabilities, and thus, on the 
necessity of individuals to have access to the material goods connected 
to this process. Analogous positions can be found in rawls and in other 
theories of social justice. the basic idea is: when these goods are not 
easily available, individuals should be helped to get them. the point 
is: which material goods are to be handed out, how, and by whom? 
Since they involve different levels of freedom/autonomy, there are many 
answers to these questions, and in this context I shall offer a simple one 
concerning the most basic level: the state should guarantee to everybody 
an unconditional minimal income in order that everyone may attain basic 
autonomy, i.e., the set of fundamental capabilities that allows her or   
 
6  I don’t need to mention the relevance of some brazilian novelas for contributing 
to the social acceptance of heterodox life styles: any average brazilian knows this 
very well. A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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him to think of her/himself as a minimally autonomous person. this has 
nothing to do with guaranteeing a basic income (an idea defended by van 
Parijs and others), although it can be seen as a first step towards it. the main 
difference consists in the absence of any conditionality (while basic income 
can be bound to some idea of social accountability according to which 
individuals ought to return something to the community in some form). 
every solution other than distributing such an income could be labeled 
as charity (what brazilians call assistencialismo) and as paternalistic. of 
course, there may be emergency situations in which it could be necessary 
to distribute material goods such as food, shelter etc. but beyond this 
particular case, the state intervention should be as much impersonal 
as possible. Giving money to individuals aims exactly at emancipating 
them not only from misery or poverty, but also from a social environment 
that can be a further cause of suffering. Going back to our example: a 
woman depending either on her patriarchal family or on her own labor 
force (which shall condemn her to low-wage jobs because of her lack of 
qualifications) has no real option of moving out of her environment and 
looking for a place in which she can develop her autonomy. on the other 
side, if she can count on a monthly minimal income, this fact could help 
her to dare the big step of moving out from her usual environment – even if 
to this end other causes are necessary too. of course, I’m not claiming that 
such an income should or could replace a decent public education, full 
legal protection and public legal counseling etc. what I’m claiming is that 
money is a necessary element of the material basis for autonomy (or for the 
“developing of capabilities”, or for “real freedom” – call it as you want). 
this is not a particularly new idea. For instance, in his Philosophy of 
Money Georg Simmel pointed out the fact that the rising of the idea of 
autonomy and of autonomous individuals is a specific phenomenon of 
western modernity connected to the rising first of a mercantilist, later of a 
capitalist system. Particularly useful for us is his distinction between “not 
dependency” and “independency”. Individuals in a pre-modern society 
have obligations characterized by personal bounds (e.g. the vassal to his 
lord) and are caught in a net of personal relationships and commitments, 
which lets them practically no freedom at all. In the mercantilist and 
capitalist society, those obligations become depersonalized: instead of 
owing working hours to his lord, the vassal pays a tax; in this way, the 
relationship becomes less personal and the lord appears to him not as 
the real person he is, but as an impersonal instance to which certain 
taxes are due. this makes individuals independent from each other in 
the sense that their mutual dependency (which of course still exists) is 
connected not to a net of inescapable personal relationships, rather to a 
net of impersonal relationships, i.e., a net of relationships to individuals A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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who show to us only a side of themselves: they are clients, competitors, 
suppliers etc. our relationship to them is a monetary one: we pay them 
or get paid by them for certain services. through money we buy our 
independency from any personal bound or commitment, even if we are 
still dependent on others for our life. Not dependent is only “the isolated 
dweller in the German or in the American forests” (SIMMel, 1900, 318; 
my transl.); the average individual, living with others, does depend on 
them, but can be independent from them in the above-mentioned sense: 
she does not need to be caught in a net of personal commitments and can, 
therefore, start planning her own idea of good life independently of the 
(positive or negative) opinion of people she has unavoidably to connect to 
in order to satisfy her basic necessities – in other words: independently 
from the role her next social environment imposes on her. She becomes 
free of assuming other roles (but not free from assuming roles at all, since 
this would be impossible).
I would like to stretch that so-thought autonomy is not a quality of the 
individual as such, as it is the case, say, of her complexion, physical strength 
and so on. It rather depends on the relations this individual establishes 
with others. As Simmel puts it: “Individual freedom is no internal quality 
of an isolated subject, but a phenomenon of correlation which loses its 
meaning when there is no counter-part” (SIMMel, 1900, 318, my transl.). 
Material independency (guaranteed through money) is an essential 
element of it and should be therefore considered a basic good that could 
be the object of public policies aimed at creating autonomous citizens. 
the material basis that allows individuals to develop their autonomy 
can be in a second moment thought of as an object of rights: redistribution 
becomes then a matter of recognition (not just a separate, even if equally 
important matter),7 since through redistribution the individual is able to 
obtain a higher level of autonomy, which – as we have seen – is thinkable 
only in inter-subjective terms. Put it in another way: the legal guarantee 
of a basic income constitutes a form of social recognition and can be 
considered as a peculiar form of solidarity along with the one individuated 
by Honneth (solidarity-as-individual-care). It expresses the solidarity 
of a political community towards its members, that is, it is expression 
of an institutional (not individual) care for their autonomy. A policy of 
universal minimal income would represent the unification of two forms 
of recognition (the legal and the social one), and it would make possible 
at the same time that individuals develop a stronger autonomy from their 
next environment. on the other side, other conditions should be met in   
 
7  this is Nancy Fraser’s position in her dialogue with Honneth (see FrASer and 
HoNNetH 2003)A. Pinzani – Minimal income as basic condition for autonomy
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order that individuals reach firstly basic autonomy and develop secondly 
a higher level of it – conditions that may depend on the existence of 
public policies, but which are also connected to the social and cultural 
environment and to the possibility of changing this environment. In 
other words: while a universal minimal income is a necessary element 
of basic autonomy, it might not be a sufficient one and, certainly, it is 
not sufficient for a higher level of autonomy. whether a higher autonomy 
can be reached, and at which extent, is a question that can only be 
answered considering the specific situation in which individuals live: 
their next environment, social institutions, the state etc. In this sense, if 
we consider the specific situation of poor women and men in brazil, we 
shall have to take into account a number of conditions under which they 
can gain autonomy. only having identified such conditions shall we be 
able to identify the policies, which could lead them to develop autonomy. 
From this point of view, Honneth is right in pointing out the necessity that 
political theory cooperates with other disciplines such as sociology or 
psychology, if it aims at being relevant for political praxis and if it doesn’t 
want to not be a mere intellectual exercise.
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